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Abstract
We revisit the flatland paradox proposed by Stone (1976) which is
an example of non-conglomerability. The main novelty in the analysis
of the paradox is to consider marginal vs conditional models rather
than proper vs improper priors. We show that in the first model
a prior distribution should be considered as a probability measure
whereas, in the second one, a prior distribution should be considered
in the projective space of measure. This induce two different kinds of
limiting arguments which are useful to understand the paradox. We
also show that the choice of a flat prior is not adapted to the struc-
ture of the parameter space and we consider an improper prior based
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on reference priors with nuisance parameters for which the Bayesian
analysis matches the intuitive reasoning.
Keywords: Bayesian inference, flat prior, projective space, improper
prior, reference prior.
MSC: 62C05, 62C10, 62C15
1 Introduction
Improper priors are commonly used in Bayesian statistics, especially when
no prior information is available. However, using improper priors may lead
to some inconsistencies between an intuitive or classical approach and a
Bayesian analysis. The Flatland paradox, introduced by Stone (1976), is an
example of such inconsistency and has been largely commented in the litera-
ture. The main argument involved to explain the paradox is the improperness
of the flat prior which leads to non-conglomerability, see e.g. Schervish et al.
(1984), Heath and Sudderth (1989), Jaynes (2003). It is also an example of
inconsistency of the limit behaviour of sequences of proper priors, such as
uniform priors with large range.
The aim of this paper is to propose a new way to analyse paradoxes
based on the use of improper priors. Rather than considering proper vs
improper priors, we prefer to consider two different Bayesian paradigms,
one associated to the marginal model and the other one to the conditional
model. The way to consider a prior distribution and limiting arguments is
quite different from one paradigm to the other and can explain the paradox.
In Section 2, we recall the statistical problem. In Section 3, we show that
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the choice of the flat prior is not adapted to the problem in the sense that
the parameter of interest used in the intuitive reasoning is not the whole
parameter but a sub-parameter for which the related prior distribution is
not flat but highly informative. Then, we propose an improper prior that
makes a distinction between nuisance parameters and parameters of interest
and which corresponds to the intuitive reasoning. In Section 4, we propose
an analysis of the paradox by limiting arguments based on two different
paradigms. We replace the flat prior by a sequence of proper priors and we
examine the limit when the range tends to the whole parameter space. In
the first paradigm, there is no inconsistency whereas for the second one, the
inconsistency remains even with proper priors, provided that we reconsider
the interpretation of prior distributions and non-conglomerability.
2 The Flatland paradox
We give here a presentation of the model as presented in Stone (1982). Con-
sider a tetrahedral die which is tossed a unknown number of times, say N
which is probably large. The faces of the die are labelled ”a”, ”b”, ”a−1”
and ”b−1”. At each toss, the outcome is recorded subject to the rule that
if the outcome is the inverse of the previous one, the two outcomes are re-
moved, i.e. they annihilate each other. So, at the end, we get a path, denoted
by θ with no consecutive inverse symbols. However, θ is not observed but
a supplementary toss is performed and the resulting path, denoted by x is
registered following the same rule. Observing x, a statistician has to guess
θ.
Let Θ be the set of such finite paths. We denote by x− the path obtained
from x after removing the last outcome and by A+x the set of the three
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possible paths obtained from x by adding a symbol without annihilation.
Denote Ax = A
+
x
∪ {x−} the four possible paths obtained from x. In the
special case where x is the null path, denoted by 0, A0 = A
+
0 is the set
of the four possible paths of length 1 and x− is not defined. Similarly, we
define θ−, A+
θ
and Aθ. For example, if θ is the path . . . abaa, then A
+
θ
=
{. . . abaaa, . . . abaab, . . . abaab−1} and θ− = . . . aba. The likelihood of the
model is
l(θ; x) = p(x|θ) =
1
4
1θ∈Ax =
1
4
1x∈Aθ , (1)
where p(x|θ) = P(X = x|θ). Given any non-null θ, the event ”there is no
annihilation” (at the last toss) can be written ”x ∈ A+
θ
” and we have
P(”no annihilation”|θ) = P(X ∈ A+
θ
| θ) =


3
4
if θ 6= 0,
1 if θ = 0.
(2)
So, with probability greater or equal to 3/4, the path x will be longer
than the path θ for any non-null path θ. Intuitively, a good estimate of θ is
θˆ = x−, the only θ for which there is no annihilation.
This statistical model was first proposed by Lehmann (1959) to give an
example of a best equivariant estimator which is not admissible. Identifying
Θ as the free group generated by a and b, then the minimax equivariant
estimator for θ under the 0/1 loss function is any θ˜ such that θ˜(x) belongs to
A+
x
. However, the intuitive estimator θˆ = x− dominate uniformly θ˜ for the
associated risk function.
Stone (1976) propose a Bayesian version of this inferential problem and
put a flat prior π(θ) ∝ 1 on θ, which corresponds to the right Haar measure
of the free group which is known to be associated to the best equivariant
estimator. The posterior distribution is therefore:
4
π(θ|x) ∝ l(θ; x) π(θ) =
1
4
1θ∈Ax .
Given a non null path x, the event ”no annihilation” can be written ”θ = x−”
or ”x ∈ A+
θ
” with a posterior probability
P(”no annihilation”|x) =


1
4
if x 6= 0,
0 if x = 0.
(3)
The inconsistency between (2) and (3), named ”the Flatland paradox”
after Stone (1976), is an example of non-conglomerability (de Finetti, 1972;
Kadane et al., 1986). We have simultaneously P(”no annihiliation” | θ) ≥ 3
4
for any θ and P(”no annihiliation” | x) ≤ 1
4
for any x. More generally a non-
conglomerability phenomenon occurs for some event, say A, if there exists
0 < a < 1 such that
P(A|x) < a, ∀x (4)
and P(A|θ) > a, ∀θ. (5)
Of course, if the prior distribution π were a probability distribution, such
inconsistency could not occur since∫
P(A|x)p(x) dx =
∫
P(A|θ)π(θ) dθ,
where p(x) =
∫
p(x|θ)π(θ) dθ is the marginal probability distribution of x.
Note that if π is improper, then p(x) is no longer a probability distribution.
Other examples of non-conglomerability and their analysis by using finitely
additive probability can be found in Kadane et al. (1986).
In the following, we give new insights of this phenomenon. We denote by
ℓ(θ) the length of θ, by ℓ(x) the length of x and by nℓ the number of paths
of length ℓ. We have n0 = 1, n1 = 4, and nℓ = 4× 3
ℓ−1, ℓ ≥ 2.
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The importance of examining the distribution of ℓ(θ) has been first pointed
out by Hill (1980) and will be the key point for one part of the explanation
of the paradox.
3 A 2-dimensional re-parameterization approach
In this section, we show that a flat prior on θ induces a highly informative
prior distribution on ℓ(θ). This prior does not correspond to the intuitive
approach that suggests a flat prior on ℓ(θ). Therefore, we propose another
improper prior on θ that consider ℓ(θ) as a parameter of interest and the
specific path of a given length as a nuisance parameter. For this prior, the
paradox disappears.
To explore the features of an improper prior π, we define risk ratios, or a
relative weights, of any two finite events A and B:
RR(A;B) =
π(A)
π(B)
.
It is worth noting that RR(A;B) does not depend on the arbitrary chosen
scalar factor in the definition of π. The improper prior distribution on ℓ(θ)
derived from the flat prior on θ is, for ℓ ≥ 1,
π(ℓ(θ) = ℓ) ∝ 4× 3ℓ−1 ∝ 3ℓ, (6)
and therefore, for k ≥ 2, we can defined a risk ratio
RR(ℓ(θ) = k + 1; ℓ(θ) = k − 1) =
π(ℓ(θ) = k + 1)
π(ℓ(θ) = k − 1)
=
nk+1
nk−1
= 9. (7)
So, there is 9 times more ”chance” that ℓ(θ) is equal to k + 1 rather than
k − 1, or, from another point of view, the prior puts a weight 9 times larger
on k + 1 than on k − 1 for ℓ.
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Let rewrite (2) and (3) respectively as:
ODD(”no annihilation”|θ) =
P(”no annihilation”|θ)
P(”annihilation”|θ)
=
P(X ∈ A+
θ
|θ)
P(X = θ−|θ)
= 3
(8)
and
ODD(”no annihilation”|x) =
P(”no annihilation”|x)
P(”annihilation”|x)
=
π(θ = x−|x)
π(θ ∈ A+
x
|x)
=
1
3
.
(9)
Note that P(·) refer to the probability of events that involve both X and θ.
So, the inconsistency between (2) and (3) corresponds to the factor 9 between
(8) and (9). To see that this factor comes from (7), let restate the reasoning
in term of ℓ. For ℓ(θ) ≥ 1, the probability that, for a given θ, there will be
no annihilation can be written
P(ℓ(X) = ℓ(θ) + 1) | θ) =
3
4
.
Since this expression depends on θ only through ℓ(θ), we have
P(ℓ(X) = ℓ(θ) + 1) | ℓ(θ)) =
3
4
or, equivalently, for k ≥ 1,
P(ℓ(X) = k + 1 | ℓ(θ) = k)
P(ℓ(X) = k − 1 | ℓ(θ) = k)
= 3.
Now, the posterior relative risk of no annihilation vs annihilation is
π(ℓ(θ) = k − 1|ℓ(x) = k)
π(ℓ(θ) = k + 1|ℓ(x) = k)
=
P(ℓ(x) = k | ℓ(θ) = k − 1)
P(ℓ(x) = k | ℓ(θ) = k + 1)
×
π(ℓ(θ) = k − 1)
π(ℓ(θ) = k + 1)
=
3
9
=
1
3
.
It can be seen how the prior distribution involved in this formula influ-
ences the posterior distribution. So, the inconsistency between the intuitive
and Bayesian solutions comes from the fact that the prior is highly infor-
mative on the parameter of interest ℓ(θ). To show that the paradox is not
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directly related to the improperness of the prior but to its construction, we
propose another improper prior, say π˜, which is implicitly used is the intuitive
reasoning and for which the inconsistency disappears.
We do not know ℓ(θ) but we just think that ℓ(θ) is probably large and we
implicitly assume that, as a prior knowledge, the event ”ℓ(θ) = k” is almost
as likely as the event ”ℓ(θ) = k−1” or that ”ℓ(θ) = k+1” especially for large
values of k, so we put, as an approximation, a flat prior on ℓ(θ). Knowing
the length ℓ of θ and using symmetry arguments, any path of length ℓ has
the same probability to be drawn, which is equal to 1
4×3ℓ−1
for ℓ ≥ 1. The
resulting prior on θ is, for ℓ(θ) ≥ 1,
π˜(θ) ∝ π˜(θ|ℓ(θ)) π˜(ℓ(θ)) ∝
1
4× 3ℓ(θ)−1
∝
1
3ℓ(θ)
(10)
The prior π˜ can also be obtained by using reference priors with nuisance
parameters as proposed by Bernardo (1979); Berger and Bernardo (1992) or
Kass and Wasserman (1996): the parameter θ can be split into two param-
eters: θ = (ℓ, η), where ℓ is the length of the path and η = 1, .., nℓ is the
index of the path within the pathes of length ℓ. We can consider ℓ as the
parameter of interest and η as a nuisance parameter. The reference prior
on ℓ is the flat prior and we know exactly the distribution of η|ℓ which is a
uniform distribution over {1, 2, ..., nℓ). The resulting prior is therefore π˜.
For ℓ(x) ≥ 2, the posterior distribution is
π˜(θ|x) ∝
1
3ℓ(θ)
1θ∈Ax .
and therefore
P(”no annihilation”|x)
P(”annihilation”|x)
=
π˜(θ = x−|x)
π˜(θ ∈ A+
x
|x)
=
3ℓ(x)+1
3× 3l(x)−1
= 3. (11)
which matches (8) or equivalently P(”no annihilation”|x) = 3/4 which matches
(2). So, the intuitive reasoning is in fact a Bayesian reasoning using the im-
8
proper distribution (10) for which the paradox disappears. We may note that
a similar effect is seen in the marginalization paradox by Stone and Dawid
(1972, Example 1) where the paradox disappears when using another im-
proper prior.
Remark : Jaynes (2003, p. 453) tried to explain the paradox by exploring the
link between the priors on N , the number of tosses and the priors on ℓ(θ).
We think that this leads to unnecessary complications since the problem can
be restated as follows : from the second toss, instead of drawing at random
one of the four faces of the tetrahedral die, we draw at random with equal
probability one of the three letters that is not the inverse of that appearing
in the previous outcome. Only at the supplementary toss that generate x,
one letter among the four possible ones is drawn at random, which may lead
to a possible annihilation. In that case, ℓ(θ) = N and the paradox, i. e. the
inconsistency between (2) and (3) remains the same.
4 An approach by a limiting argument
In this section, we propose another approach of the problem by considering
limits of proper priors. Let replace the flat prior π by πM , the uniform prior
on the paths of lengths lower or equal toM . WhenM is large, it is commonly
admitted that πM is an approximation of the flat prior. Since the number of
paths with lengths between 0 and M is equal to 2× 3M − 1, πM(θ) is defined
by
πM(θ) =
1
2× 3M − 1
10≤ℓ(θ)≤M . (12)
Equivalently, πM can be seen as a result of a two steps random procedure
corresponding to the parameterization (ℓ, η) described in Section 3:
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- step 1: draw at random a length ℓ, according to the distribution πM(ℓ) =
4×3ℓ−1
2×3M−1
if ℓ 6= 0 and πM(0) =
1
2×3M−1
.
- step 2: draw at random a path θ of length ℓ from a uniform prior: π(θ|ℓ) =
1
4×3ℓ−1
1ℓ(θ)=ℓ if ℓ 6= 0. If ℓ = 0, θ is the null path with probability 1.
To understand the notion of approximation and its implication when M
goes to +∞, it is necessary to distinguish between two Bayesian paradigms
corresponding respectively to a subjective and an objective approach.
Paradigm 1 (subjective approach): we assume that θ is drawn at random
according to πM . Therefore, θ can be considered as a random effect with
known distribution πM . We may note that an improper prior π is not relevant
in this approach since it is not a probability distribution. The relevant model
for x is the marginal model pM(x) =
∑
θ
l(θ; x)πM (θ). Changing M implies
that the way x is generated also changes, which means that it is irrelevant to
consider the limit of the posterior distribution with respect to πM for x fixed.
Therefore, in the limiting argument, it is essential to consider the behaviour
of x.
Since πM is a probability, we have:
PM(”no annihiliation”) =
∑
θ
πM (θ) P(”no annihilation” | θ) (13)
=
3
4
+
1
4
πM (0) ≈
3
4
, (14)
where πM(0) is negligible for M large. Clearly, we also have
PM(”no annihiliation”) =
∑
x
pM(x) PM(”no annihilation” | x) (15)
From (14) and 15, on average over x, P(”no annihiliation”|x) is almost
equal to 3/4, which corresponds to the intuitive reasoning and the standard
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probability rules. Knowing x gives more information:
PM(”no annihilation”|x) =


1 if ℓ(x) = M or M + 1,
1
4
if 1 ≤ ℓ(x) ≤M − 1,
0 if ℓ(x) = 0.
(16)
By a straightforward calculation, the event PM (l(X) =M or M + 1) ≈
2
3
and PM(1 ≤ ℓ(X) < M) ≈
1
3
. So, for the prior πM , the difference between
(2) and (3), which was called inconsistency for the flat prior, remains, but
only when ℓ(x) < M which occurs with probability ≈ 1/3. This can be
explained intuitively, as in the improper case, by the fact that there is 9
times more chances that ℓ(θ) = ℓ(x) + 1 rather than ℓ(θ) = ℓ(x) − 1 when
1 ≤ ℓ(x) ≤ M − 1. So, given x, it is more likely that ℓ(θ) = ℓ(x) + 1 with
annihilation than ℓ(θ) = ℓ(x)− 1 without annihilation.
Now, let M go to +∞. As mentioned above, considering the limit of
PM(”no annihiliation”|x) or more generally πM (·|x) for x fixed is not rele-
vant: if M get larger, the values of ℓ(x) get larger with a high probability.
For example, it is not possible to replace πM by π in (15) for the limiting
expression since it gives +∞ whereas the limit is 3/4. In Eq. (14), p(x) is
formally equal to 1 for the flat prior, and therefore is not defined as a proba-
bility distribution on x (see Taraldsen and Lindqvist, 2010). This illustrates
the fact that the flat prior cannot be considered as the limit case of inference
with πM and that limiting arguments are not valid. So, whenM goes to +∞,
we can only say that ℓ(x) goes to +∞ in the sense that PM(ℓ(X) ≤ k) goes
to 0 for any fixed k. The most probable case, that is ”l(X) =M or M + 1”,
which corresponds to ”no annihilation” with conditional probability 1, varies
with the prior, as pointed out by Stone (1982).
Paradigm 2 (objective approach): we consider that there is some θ such
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that x has been generated according to p(x|θ). The relevant model for X
in this paradigm is the conditional model p(x|θ) = l(θ; x) rather than the
marginal model pM(x) in the subjective approach. Here, θ is considered as
a fixed parameter rather than a random effect. In that case, πM is not the
actual way to generate θ, but a way to make inference on θ. To cite J.M.
Bernardo in Irony and Singpurwalla (1997), ”one should not interpret any
non-subjective prior as a probability distribution”. So, it is not relevant in
this paradigm to give an interpretation of the marginal distribution pM(x)
of X neither of the joint distribution of (X, θ) based on πM . Therefore, it is
irrelevant to consider PM(”no annihiliation”) in (15) which is related to the
joint distribution. Changing the prior distribution will not change the way to
generate x, but will only change the posterior distribution and the related in-
ference on θ. It is therefore relevant here to consider the limit of the posterior
distribution for x fixed. Moreover, for any scalar α > 0, π and απ give the
same posterior distribution which means that prior distributions are defined
up to a scalar factor. This leads to consider prior distributions in a projective
space of measures and not as probabilities (see Bioche and Druilhet (2016)
or Taraldsen and Lindqvist (2016)).
In the projective space, improper priors appear naturally as limit of
proper prior sequences for the corresponding convergence mode, named q-
vague convergence (Bioche and Druilhet, 2016): a sequence {πM}M∈N of dis-
crete priors is said to converge q-vaguely to the discrete prior π if there
exists some scalars aM such that aMπM(θ) converges to π(θ) for any θ.
Here, choosing aM = 2 × 3
M − 1, it is easy to see that πM converges to
the flat prior π. Therefore, contrary to Paradigm 1, πM can be seen as an
approximation of the flat prior. Note that the q-vague convergence of πM
implies the convergence for the posterior distribution for x fixed. For exam-
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ple, from (16), limM→+∞ PM(”no annihilation”|x) =
1
4
which matches with
P(”no annihilation”|x) under the flat prior. This illustrates the fact that
limiting arguments for x fixed are valid in the second paradigm.
We now justify the fact that, in the second paradigm, the improperness
of the prior is not directly involved in the inconsistency by showing that the
inconsistency remains with proper priors sufficiently close to the flat prior.
In practice, a statistician has a vague idea of the range in which θ lies and
instead of choosing a flat prior, he will choose a prior of type πM . If he thinks
that the length of θ is probably not greater than some hundred of thousands,
he will choose M equal to some millions in order to be sure to encompass
the true value of θ with a sufficient faith. He assumes implicitly that the
precise choice of M will not have a great influence on the results since it
does not assume that the prior represents the actual way to draw θ. This is
the case here, since provided that ℓ(θ) < M − 1, the posterior distribution
πM(θ|x) does not depend on M . So, if the statistician is almost certain that
ℓ(θ) < M − 1, then he is also almost certain that ℓ(x) < M . So, for those x,
the inconsistency between the intuitive and the Bayesian answers remains.
The non-conglomerability is also achieved by a proper prior if we change the
condition ”∀x” in (4) by the condition ”for any expected x”. We see again
than the inconsistency is due to the inappropriate choice of the flat prior as
prior knowledge, as explained in Section 3 rather than its improperness.
5 Discussion
The Flatland paradox is a striking example where a flat prior or a right Haar
measure on a discrete parameter cannot be considered as a non-informative
prior or as a reflect of ignorance. This is mainly due to the structure of the
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parameter space. As described by Abbott (1884), changing the dimension of
a space may change the shape of its subsets and mountains may appear flat.
This is the case here: the parameter space Θ can be defined in one dimension
Θ = {θn, n ∈ N} or in two dimensions Θ = {(ℓ, η) ; 1 ≤ η ≤ nℓ, ℓ ∈ N}. A
flat prior on θ gives an exponentially increasing prior for ℓ. The fact that a
flat prior on ℓ gives a satisfactory answer shows that there does not exist an
automated way to choose a prior when no information is available or when
we want to ignore the partial information we have.
The Flatland paradox, as many other paradoxes or inconsistencies that
arise in Bayesian inference with improper priors, suggests that there is a gap
between proper and improper priors. On the other side, improper priors are
often considered as limits of proper priors. Rather than considering proper
vs improper priors, we prefer to make a distinction between two different
Bayesian paradigms. Each paradigm has its own rules and mixing the rules
from one paradigm to the other one generates paradoxes. This is the case for
limiting arguments that are quite different from one paradigm to the other
one.
In the first paradigm, θ is considered as a random effect and the prior
distribution should be considered as a way to draw the parameter. The
prior distribution must be a probability distribution and improper priors
should be excluded. The relevant model for the data is the marginal model
and non-conglomerability phenomenon cannot occur according to standard
probability rules. Limiting arguments with respect to the prior distribution
should include the fact that the marginal distribution of x also changes and
improper priors do not appear as limits of proper priors as we have shown.
In the second paradigm, θ is an unknown parameter and the relevant
model for x is the conditional model. Prior distributions should be consid-
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ered in a projective space of measures, i.e. defined up to a scalar factor,
rather than a probability distributions. There is no reason in this paradigm
to exclude improper priors which appear naturally as limits of proper pri-
ors (Bioche and Druilhet, 2016, Theorem 2.6) independently of the statistical
model. The rules associated to projective spaces are quite different to that as-
sociated to probability distributions and non-conglomerability phenomenon
may occur. Limiting arguments should be considered with x fixed. The con-
vergence mode associated to the projective space is the q-vague convergence
and can explain for example, the Lindley paradox (Bioche and Druilhet,
2016).
A general consequence of this approach is that inconsistencies in the limit
may arise in equations involving the joint or the predictive distributions when
we replace a sequence of proper priors πn by its limit π in the sense of the
q-vague convergence. Indeed, joint or predictive distributions are associated
to the first paradigm whereas the q-vague convergence is associated to the
second one. This is the case for the non-conglomerability example analysed
in this paper as e.g. in Eq. (15). However, the limit involving the posterior
distribution with x fixed is consistent as in Eq. (16).
This approach suggests a general method to analyse inconsistencies or
paradoxes. If the reasoning involves the joint or predictive distribution, then,
only proper priors that reflect a subjective knowledge should be considered
and the relevant model is the marginal model. Improper priors are allowed
only in an objective approach, where the relevant model is the conditional
model and where improper priors can be considered as limits of proper priors.
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